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Visual Propaganda in the Democratic Republic of




In this article, a single poster about the land reform carried out by
the Peopleʼs Democratic Party of Afghanistan is discussed. The start-
ing point for the project is the statement that persuasion is more ef-
fective than compulsion and that the Afghan communists did not find
any formula to engage in effective dialogue with their society. The
primary question is: what kind of communication and what sort of
themes/motifs played a significant role in conveying revolutionary
ideology aimed at a society where a majority, with political potential,
could not read or write? The methodological basis of the project and
article is R. Barthesʼs Rhetoric of the Image and the analysis is supple-
mented with other pictorial items (photographs, postage stamps) re-
lated to the land reform as well as literary pieces and scientific studies
of this historical event.
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And finally, it came, the day when we were freed from
the landlord. Look, I always said that one day, one day
would come and we, the miserable, we would regain
our rights. Finally, my words have come true. Let’s
thank God that we’ve lived to see this day.1
The land reform has a strategic plan, strategic slogans,
and specific tactics.2
1 Introduction
The article, as a continuation of two texts published in 2015 and 2017 re-
spectively,3 is a part of a research project on the propaganda employed by
the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (hereafter: DRA)
representing the political-ideological programme of the would-be Marxist-
Leninist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (hereafter: PDPA).4
As in the two previous articles, the starting point of the discussion is a
premise that the language as well as the means of communication applied by
any government while addressing its audience – in this case Afghan society –
are of particular importance.The authorities are granted trust by the citizens
who at the same time have the right to prolong (or not) their credit of con-
fidence depending on the current political, social and/or economic situation.
In extreme cases, the citizens can renounce their allegiance to the central
government and its representatives at the various levels of public administra-
tion, seeking to (forcibly) remove it from power. To prevent situations such
1 Sho’ār-e mardom, ehsās-e mardom, ātefe-ye mardom dar pishvāz-e enqelāb [People’s slo-
gan, people’s feeling, people’s emotion in welcoming the revolution], “Zhwandun [Life]”
31.04.1357AP / 22.07.1978, no. 30(17), p. 13.
2 Ziri S.M., Monāsebāt-e fivdāli dar keshvar va eslāhāt-e demukrātik-e arzi [Feudal relations in
the country and democratic land reform], s.l. 1357AP / 1978, p. 24.
3 M. M. Kłagisz, Visual Propaganda in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan – Preliminary
Report, “The Polish Journal of the Arts and Culture” 2015, no. 14(2), pp. 101–122; M. M. Kła-
gisz, Visual Propaganda in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan – Part 2. Leading Role of
the Party, “The Polish Journal of the Arts and Culture. New Series” 2017, no. 5(1), pp. 67–87.
4 I used the expression “would-be Leninist” for the first time in Part 2. following O. Royʼs state-
ment: “[o]ne can wonder if Afghan communists (who always refrained from referring to
communism) are truly communists” (O. Roy, The Origins of the Afghan Communist Party,
“Central Asian Survey” 1988, no. 7(2–3), p. 52). This time I would use “would-be Marxist-
Leninist” because of O. Royʼs utterance that “[t]hey [the communists – MMK] include a
superficial acquaintance with Marxism, a total failure to analyse the existing situation, and
a profound conviction that they were inventing a new brand of socialism, suitable for Third
World countries and without an intermediate stages” (O. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afgh-
anistan, Cambridge 1986, p. 84).
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as this from happening and to remain in power, the authorities should use
phraseology that is as clear for the audience as possible. That is the only way
to convince the people to accept a particular version of politics and vision
of reality. Consequently, the authorities try to gain an absolute dominance
over sources of information and means of communication to control, regu-
late, and if necessary to censor, what citizens read, watch and listen to and
how they do so.5 Such tasks can be accomplished in various ways, by means
of press, radio, television, as well as literature or the fine arts. The choice of
techniques of persuasion results from a number of historical-cultural factors
(e.g. the presence or lack of manuscript/print/painting traditions) as well as
socio-cultural ones (e.g. the level of illiteracy, quality and character of educa-
tion). An effective choice guarantees success but an inappropriate one risks
making the whole undertaking failure.
Talking about persuasion, one additional socio-political factor should be
taken into account – namely, the social base of the government. Its range
and structure is crucial in shaping the language used by politicians while
speaking to the people. If the social base of the government is broad, the au-
thorities only need to enhance their support. If it is limited, however, they are
forced first of all to acquire the backing of various social/professional/ethnic
groups so as to be able to consolidate their power from these bases in the
future. This is the case of the PDPA before and after 1978. Being mostly of
an urban and intellectual character, it lacked popularity in the countryside:
“The communist leaders have always been conscious of the fact that they
have been creating a revolution by proxy, faced with a nebulous working
class and an apathetic peasantry”.6 That is why, shortly after the army-led
Saur Revolution in April 1978, the DRA government tried by all means to
win the peasants’ support and launched a land reform (hereafter: the ’79 LR;
Decree No. 8)7:
Question [by –MMK] PolishNewsAgency correspondent:What
are your immediate and foremost responsibilities in the arena of
social and economic policy?
5 A. Kampka, Retoryka jako manifestacja i uprawomocnienie władzy [in:] Między znaczeniem
a działaniem. Retoryka i władza, ed. A. Kampka, Warszawa 2012, pp. 19ff.
6 O. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge 1986, p. 84.
7 The Dari text of Decree no. 8 was published in the Urdu Majalle (no. 681, 1978, pp. 17–21)
and the Pashto in the Ata Inqilābi (1979, pp. 99–141). The text has never been translated into
English, and only an Italian translation exists (G. Vercellin, Afghanistan 1973–1978: dalla
Repubbica Presidenziale alla Repubblica Democratica, Venezia 1979, pp. 107–14).
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Answer [by N.-M. – MMK]: We want land reforms in its real
sense. (…)
Question Polish News Agency correspondent: Do you have a
specific land reform program for Afghanistan.
Answer: Yes, we have, but the study of the technical aspects of
this program requires time, and then it will be implemented. We
had not studied the technical aspects of this program before but
now we shall carry out this study.8
Though the easiest way to gain someone’s trust is to speak in their own
language, the PDPA had created its own tongue that was largely unfamiliar
to most of their (il)literate compatriots.9 Unlike the majority of the elites in
the Islamic world who, confronting the need for modernisation, remained
loyal to their religion, its ideas, values and language, this small group of
leftists praised communist achievements.That said one may ask if they really
understood the principles of Marxism-Leninism. One should keep in mind
H. Enayat’s words, while reading this article:
The breakdown of the cultural integration of traditional soci-
ety was thus reflected in a linguistic rift, which has been one
of the chief obstacles to a coherent, sustained and fruitful de-
bate among Muslims of all classes and ages over their social and
political problems.10
H. Enayat’s “rift” is not only of linguistic character. It is also of a pictorial
nature as it involves a Barthes-esque “image” too. In this project we are more
8 Text of the Press Conference of Noor Mohammad Taraki, Secretary General of People’s Demo-
cratic Party of Afghanistan, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan with Afghan and Foreign Journalists, s.l., s.d., p. 6. The Dari version: Kon-
ferāns va mosāhebehā-ye matbuʼāti-ye Nur-Mohammad Taraki monshi-ye omumi-ye Hezb-
e Demukrātik-e Khalq-e Afqānestan, raʼis-e Shurā-ye Enqelābi va sadrāʼazam-e Jomhuri-ye
Demukrātik-e Afqānestān bā ruznāmenegārān-e khāreji-vo dākheli, s.l., s.d., pp. 13–14.
9 In the Part 2. the PDPAʼs language was characterised as “unknown (consequently, unin-
telligible)” but here the adjective “unfamiliar” is preferred as some Afghans had access to
Dari/Pashto programmes broadcast from the USSR. In the collection of the Afghan Archive
at the Institute of Oriental Studies (Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland) there is a green
nicely printed leaflet in Dari about a radio programme dedicated to the citizens of Afgh-
anistan (as well as Iran) and broadcast from Tashkent (No 1220).
10H. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, Austin 1982, p. 3.
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interested in the pictures represented by the posters than in the language
itself, although we assume that both phenomena cannot be separated.11 In
anticipation, one should highlight the fact that the the ’79 LR designed as “a
sudden break with the past”12 was accompanied by the elimination of illit-
eracy because in the opinion of the PDPA theoreticians only “agrarian free-
dom” and “enlightenment” would give the DRA government the strong and
unequivocal support of the countryside.13
2 Bildkultur
As in the Preliminary Report and Part 2., we need to continue our discus-
sion on the Bildkultur (culture of picture / pictorial culture). It is an ex-
pression adapted from R. Siebertzʼs book on 20th-century Iranian postage
stamps Die Briefmarken Irans als Mittel der Politischen Bildpropaganda14 and
re-applied here to describe an open-access, culturally-constructed semantic
system made up of pictorial signs used for mass (re-)creation, (re-)transfer
and (re-)storage of commonmemory on the same (or similar) terms as high or
popular Afghan poetry.15 In neither of the previous texts we have developed
this issue more extensively; hence, its two crucial features – open access and
being culturally-constructed – need to be more detailed here.
11The PDPA language was analysed by E. Bayer (E. Bayer, Tendenzen der Entwicklung des
gesellschaftspolitischen Wortschatzes der Demokratischen Volkspartei Afghanistans (DVPA) in
schriftlichen Dokumenten für den Zeitraum 1965-1986: eine Untersuchung sprachlichen Wan-
dels in den Sprachen Dari und Pasto, Berlin 1988; E. Bayer, Sprachlicher Wandel als Ergebnis
politisch motivierter Sprachlenkung: neuere Entwicklungen im Pašto Afghanistans, [in:] B. G.
Fragner et al. (ed.), Proceedings of the Second European Conference of Iranian Studies held in
Bamberg, 30th September to 4th October 1991, by the Societas Iranologica Europeae, Rome 1995,
pp. 53–63).
12 O. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge 1986, p. 85. F. Fukuyama wrote:
“Many on the Left shared the view that a radical socialist regime in the Third World could
legitimate itself, even in the absence of free elections and open discussion, by engaging in
land reform, providing free health care, and raising literacy levels” (E. Fukuyama, The End
of History and The Last Man, New York-Toronto 1992, p. 10).
13 Ibidem.
14 R. Siebertz, Die Briefmarken Irans als Mittel der Politischen Bildpropaganda, Wien 2005.
15 J. Darmesteter, Chants populaires des Afghans, Paris 1888–1890; G. F. Girs, Istorieskie pesni
puštunov, Moskva 1984.; J. Caron, Reading the Power of Printed Orality in Afghanistan: Popu-
lar Pashto Literature as Historical Evidence and Public Intervention, “Journal of Social History”
(Fall 2011) 45(1): 172–94.
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Open access means that there are no restrictions on access to informa-
tion. Since any information is coded pictorially there is no need for a script
that would exclude the illiterate from the typographic culture based on prin-
ted texts. If in a typographic culture even basic knowledge of the alphabet is
essential for de-coding any message, those who are unable to read or write
remain outside the main circulation of information. In this sense, the Bildkul-
tur is reserved for both the literate and the illiterate andmakes no distinction
between either social category.
Being culturally-constructed means that to decipher a pictorially coded
message requires prior cultural knowledge. We refer here to R. Barthesʼs
words: “The variation in readings is not (…) anarchic; it depends on the dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge – practical, national, cultural, aesthetic – invested
in the image and these can be classified, brought into a typology.”16 Since a
picture can be compared to a sign, it is important for both sides – the au-
thor and the addressee – to use the same set of symbols. How can someone
become acquainted with such a set? This is never taught directly or at once
but can be isolated by an individual in the process of enculturation – i.e. “the
process by which people learn the dynamics of their surrounding culture
and acquire values and norms appropriate or necessary in that culture and
worldviews”.17 In the case of religion, a set of signs is to be found in religious
teaching, common beliefs and everyday practices. Such religion-based know-
ledge means that an illiterate peasant would recognise the nameMuhammad
written on, for instance, a truck. In the case of politics, it is transferred by
local authorities, representatives of the central government, politicians, ideo-
logical programmes found in the press, broadcast on the radio, etc. It is due
to such politics-based knowledge that an illiterate adult would identify the
picture of the king/president and recognise him as the representative of the
entire nation. To make his messages more comprehensible, an author ought
to use the signs that belong to high or popular culture. Frequently used sym-
bols make a message clearer and an unambiguous message means that the
signs are used more frequently. An author is allowed, of course, to bring in
new signs but they always run the risk of their message not being commu-
nicable enough, or at least, of it taking more time to reach the addressee who
needs additional time to recognise (and interpret) the meaning of new signs.
16 R. Barthes in his article Rhetoric of the Image, [in:] Barthes R., Image – Music – Text, trans.
S. Heath, New York 1977, p. 46.
17 J. E. Grusec, P. D. Hastings, Handbook of Socialization: Theory and Research, London 2016,
p. 547.
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Accepting J. J. Eliasʼs assertion that “an image or object that is mass pro-
duced out of cheapmaterials has greater societal relevance than an expensive
item of limited circulation”,18 we should emphasise that the Bildkultur is rep-
resented by, inter alia, cinema posters, religious pictures, naïve paintings on
trucks, in tea-houses, school books and bills, flyers, hoardings, photography
or television rather than by miniatures that “speak to and for the same audi-
ence as do texts”.19
In Part 2 we presented a single example of the Afghan Bildkultur – a
mural photographed by P. Centlivres and M. Centlivres-Demont in 1990 in
Kabul. This time we would like to present another example – a painting on a
truck photographed in the 1970s. The picture represents a general feature of
the Bildkultur – i.e. mass (re-)transfer and (re-)storage of common knowledge
and/or expertise, as the Bildkultur can play a significant role in (in)formal
(self-)education processes.
Similarly to Pakistani or Indian truck drivers, Afghans richly adorn their
vehicles too.20 Inspiration for colourful drawings are European postcards or
film posters but they also include religious elements – e.g. Muhammad’s fant-
astic winged horse al-Burāq that took him from Mecca to Jerusalem.21
As J.-C. Blanc writes, the tradition of decorating trucks stems from the
older custom of adorning animals travelling with a caravan. “[R]ibbon, tas-
sels fringes and an array of good-luck charms”22 were used to pay homage
to animals. They were also used as amulets that, by repelling evil and inaus-
piciousness, were supposed to protect caravans during theit journeys. The
magical-religious nature of decorations is still present today in the form of
the tableaux. But, J.-C. Blanc adds also that “[t]hese images help to bridge
the gap between nature and progress. They perform the role of a basic alpha-
bet of modern times, by which the peasant can come to know the machinery
18 J. J. Elias, Aishaʼs Cushion. Religious Art, Perception, and Practice in Islam, London 2012, p. 18.
19 Ibidem, p. 17. On illustrations accompanying manuscripts see: F. Mehran, The Break-line
Verse: The Link between Text and Image in the “First Small” Shahnama [in:] Melville Ch. (ed.),
Shahnama Studies I, Cambridge 2006, pp. 151–70.
20 One of two questions formulated at the end of Part 2. was “[c]an one speak about Iranian
and Pakistani influences with regard to usage of the picture as a means of communication,
or not?” Apparently, yes. Especially since India has a long and active pictorial tradition. On
India see: K. Jain, Gods in the Bazaar, Durham-London 2007; S. Ramaswamy (ed.), Beyond
Appearances? Visual Practices and Ideologies in Modern India, New Delhi-Thousand Oaks-
London 2003.
21 I. R. Netton, A Popular Dictionary of Islam, London 1992, p. 59.
22 J.-C. Blanc, Afghan Trucks, New York 1976, p. no number.
PJAC New Series 7 (1/2018): 29–54
Kłagisz, The land belongs to those who till it! 36
Figure 1
and landscapes of Europe, and take a closer examination of the aeroplane that
crosses the sky above his valley”.23 His conclusion regarding the usefulness
of truck paintings is not limited to the magical-religious sphere of Islam but
also including education must be taken into account while discussing the
non-aesthetic values of figurative art.
3 Study
As in the Preliminary Report and Part 2, the core element of the paper is a
single socialist realistic poster published in a Moscow-printed album Afgani-
stan, revolucya prodolzhayecya (Afghanistan, the revolution continues). So far
the matter of our concern was the Saur Revolution and the leadership of the
PDPA. This time we would like to deal with a poster dedicated to the ’79 LR
started officially in January 1979 and completed in June of the same year, but
in fact never implemented in full as during 1980s some basic changes of its
programme were introduced, referred to officially as the second phase.
Following R. Barthesʼs methodology to be found in his article Rhetoric of
the Image, one can study this poster on three levels: (1) as a linguistic message
(2) as a coded iconic one, and finally (3) a non-coded iconic one.24
23 Ibidem.
24 R. Barthes in his article Rhetoric of the Image, [in:] Barthes R., Image – Music – Text, trans. S.
Heath, New York 1977, p. 32–51.
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The first kind of message, of linguistic substance, appears on the poster
twice – as a Dari exclamation: Doulat-e J[omhuri-ye] D[emukrātik-e] A[fqā-
nestān] melkiyat-e dehqānān va sāyer-e zamindārān-rā motābeq be ehkām-e
qānunmohtaram shomorde va tazminmi-konad “The government of the DRA
respects and guarantees the property of the peasants and other landowners
in accordance with the provisions of the law” and as a Pashto title on a white
booklet Dǝ ʒmǝki dǝ milkiyat rasmi sanad “official land tenure certificate.” Al-
though R. Barthes writes that the linguistic message appears before the two
others, one might dispute this assumption by raising the issue of illiterate ad-
dressees. To decipher the code of the message incorporated into the poster,
one ought to possess two sorts of skills – knowledge of the script and a com-
mand of the Dari/Pashto language. In the case of the illiterate, a command of
language cannot be used to decode the message unless the message is verb-
alised by someone else. If no-one can verbalise it, this part remains mute and
must be expressed by pictorial elements as the Bildkultur is of open access.
This means that there is a slight variation in reading the posters, because
a literate person first caches the text while moving his attention towards
the graphic, yet an illiterate ignores the text, focusing on the picture only.
Following R. Barthes, one may well ask, “What is the signifying structure
of «illustration»? Does the image duplicate certain information given in the
text by a phenomenon of redundancy or does the text add some fresh inform-
ation to the image?”25 As we will see, the information coded by the analysed
slogan and picture are not identical. They do not replace themselves but in-
stead complement each other.
The linguistic message to be found in the afore-mentioned exclamation
can be consolidated into two closely related messages – denoted and con-
noted. This means that the noun melkiyat “property” does not only sub-
stitute “a thing or things that are owned by somebody,”26 but sub-/semi-
/unconsciously refers to general ideas about possession expressed by Islamic
law.27 One of the more serious mistakes made by the DRA government was
25 R. Barthes in his article Rhetoric of the Image, [in:] Barthes R., Image – Music – Text, trans. S.
Heath, New York 1977, p. 38.
26 Oxford Advanced Learnerʼs Dictionary, Oxford 2000. p. 1058.
27 S. Habachy, Property, Right, and Contract in Muslim Law, “Columbia Law Review” 1962, 62(2),
pp. 450ff.
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Figure 2
a harsh violation of the time- and religion-honoured property right. The
second significant element of the exclamation are the nouns dehqānān
“peasants” and zamindārān “landlords.” The first denotes a regular peasant
(Dr dehqān, Ps bazgar), a smallholder (Dr dehqān-e kam-zamin, Ps ləẓ-ʒməki
bazgar), a “nolandholder” (Dr dehqān-e bi-zamin, Ps bi-ʒməki bazgar)28 as
28The neologism “nolandholder” refers to those peasants who have no land to work on and
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well as a farm worker (Dr kārgar-e zirāʾati, Ps zirāʾati kārgar). The latter
refers apparently to those who, before the ’79 LR, had been the owners of
large estates and served the first group as, inter alia, creditors within the
gerau mortgage system and beneficiaries within the sud usury one. In the
aggressive propaganda of the first two years after 1978 the dehqānān were
recognised as an underprivileged social group while the zamindārān as an
exploitative one.29
Two more linguistic elements that should be mentioned here are qānun
“law” and tazmin “guarantee.”The first word raises the question of the nature
of the legislative system. Is the right of property guaranteed by traditional
Islamic law or by a modern non-Islamic one?: how do both systems com-
ply with each other? The second one raises the question of the nature of the
guarantee. What are the peasants and landowners protected from? Consid-
ering the total misunderstanding of the nature of the Afghan countryside,
serious mistakes made at the beginning of the ’79 LR, when landlords were
humiliated in public and arbitrarily deprived of their property, and finally the
fact that those who received expropriated land became the object of attacks
from former owners, one can assume that the analysed poster was designed
to change growing popular outrage at this public policy. In fact, the DRA
state did not secure the new law against the dissatisfaction of those who lost
the most, and “[g]iven the strong tradition of land ownership recognized
by Islam, expropriation was anathema to many leading religious figures and
peasants also risked religious opprobrium by farming redistributed land”.30
The second and third kind of the message, of iconic substance, appears
in the form of a peasant of unknown age who looks ahead rather than at
us, holding his land tenure and land-use rights certificate in his right hand.
On a white booklet decorated with the emblem of the DRA one can read
the official name of the republic and Dǝ ʒmǝki dǝ milkiyat rasmi sanad “offi-
cial land tenure certificate,” but even those who were illiterate, with an eye
on current political developments as well as on the activity of the local au-
thorities that represented the ideological programme of the PDPA, should
have easily understood what kind of document this was. Among different
articles published by the Haqiqat-e Enqelāb-e Saur (Truth of the April Revolu-
need to lease it.
29 O. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge 1986, p. 85
30 F. L. Pryor, The Red and the Green. The Rise and Fall of Collectivized Agriculture in Marxist
Regimes, Princeton 1992, p. 94–95.
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tion; hereafter HES) – an official press organ of the Central Committee of
the PDPA – one can find a small black-and-white photograph taken dur-
ing an official ceremony when the land tenure certificates were distributed
among peasants of the Faryāb province. Four peasants, speaking, maybe jok-
ing, present their documents to the reader. The atmosphere captured by the
photographer seems to be peaceful, eventually they became landowners. All
the same, our attention is drawn to the fact that none of the four peasants is
looking straight at the camera. Unlike the peasant in the poster, everyone is
looking away.
Figure 3: HES 01.12.1362AP / 19.02.1984, no. 753, p. 2. According to the text
125,000 noland- and smallholders living in the Faryāb province received their
land tenure certificates during the second phase of the land reform.31
The peasant clutches a sickle to his breast with his left hand. The choice
of tool cannot be accidental and the sickle should be understood not only as a
“tool with a curved blade and a short handle, used for cutting grass or corn”,32
or “an agricultural implement similar in form and use to a reaping-hook, but
properly distinguished from this by having a serrated cutting-edge”33 but
31TheHES published from time to time enthusiastic articles on the land reform, e.g.:Hamrāh bā
dehqānān [Together with the Peasants], “HES” 03.05.1364AP / 24.07.1985, no. 1186, p. 1–2; Bā
bāvar-e bozorg be āyande [With Great Belief in the Future], “HES” 03.05.1364AP / 24.07.1985,
no. 1186, p. 1; Mālekin-e asli-ye zamin [The Main Landowners], “HES” 22.07.1364AP /
14.10.1985, no. 1250, p. 1–2. Some of them were supplemented by photographs, but, keeping
in mind the military situation in Afghanistan, we cannot be sure that those photographs
were not actually fabricated.
32 Oxford Advanced Learnerʼs Dictionary, Oxford 2000. p. 1242.
33 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. XV, Oxford 1989, p. 415.
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first and foremost as a symbol of agronomic activities. On the postage stamp
presented below and issued in 1984 on the occasion of the Dǝ bazgar wraʒ
“Day of the Peasant” one can see a peasant folding a sheaf and a sickle:
Figure 4: The collection of seven postage stamps was issued on 21 March
1984, i.e. on the Afghan New Year (Dr Nawruz) celebrated also as the Day of
the Peasant (see R. Jack, Afghanistan 1973-2014. A Specialised Catalogue, s.l.
2014, p. 30) Other single postage stamps and series dedicated to the festival
were issued in 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1989 respectively
(ibidem, p. 14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 30, 34, 58 [private collection]).
The sickle as a symbol of agronomic activities, agriculture, or the coun-
tryside in general, appears also in the title of a socialist-realist novel by A.
Habib Dāshā va dasthā (Sickles and Hands) about Rahim – an ambitious
youth who voluntarily enlists in the DRA army to fight against counter-
revolutionaries, to educate people about the new Marxism-Leninism as well
as to help peasants in their, inter alia, agricultural work.34 In some other
works by A. Habib like the poem Dehqān (Peasant) a sickle held by a farmer
facing straight ahead even transforms into a semi-magical instrument.35 Fi-
nally, on one of the illustrations accompanying a series of articles published
in the HES in 1981 on the 18th anniversary of the establishing of the PDPA,
we can distinguish three social groups of workers, soldiers and peasants by
34 A. Habib, Dāshā va dasthā, Kābol 1362AP/1983, pp. 67–68.
35 A. Habib, Dehqān, [in:] A. Habib, Khatt-e sorkh, Kābol 1362AP/1983, p. 66.
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a hammer, a rifle and just a sickle respectively.36 A question thus arises as
to whether this conventional usage of the three tools as emblems was an
Afghan concept or, most probably, if they had been adapted from the Soviet
set of propaganda symbols.37
Analysing the meaning of the sickle, it is worth referring to R. Barthesʼs
words that “(…) we are here dealing with a normal system whose signs are
drawn from a cultural code (…). What gives this system its originality is that
the number of readings of the same lexical unit or lexia (of the same image)
varies according to individuals”.38 His assertions allow us to claim that the
peasant’s simple tool corresponds with a more modern and more technically
complicated machine like a tractor crossing the field somewhere behind the
main character and pulling a loaded trailer. This basic visual element sug-
gests that tradition and modernity can co-exist next to each other but let it
not delude us for it is modernity alone that shapes the future and not tradi-
tion. Articles on the mechanisation of Afghan agriculture and photographs
showing modern agronomic tools metaphorically called ālāt-e asri – “mod-
ern instruments” – were quite frequently printed in the HES:39
36M.M. Kłagisz, Visual Propaganda in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan – Part 2. Leading
Role of the Party, “The Polish Journal of the Arts and Culture. New Series” 2017, no. 5(1), p.
81.
37 See a similar issue raised in the Part 2. and a discussion on a mural photographed by P. Cent-
livres and M. Centlivres-Demont in October 1990 in Kabul. It shows a girl who symbolises
the homeland and the Kabul-based government, although in the common Afghan imagin-
ation the homeland is perceived as masculine rather than feminine (70–72). On the other
hand, one can find such articles as the Az mādar-vatan defāʼ mi-konim [We defend our moth-
erland] (“HES” 15.05.1363AP / 05.08.1984, no. 893, p. 1), where the fatherland is in fact a
motherland.
38 R. Barthes in his article Rhetoric of the Image, [in:] Barthes R., Image – Music – Text, trans. S.
Heath, New York 1977, p. 46.
39 Cf. “HES” 10.04.1366AP / 01.06.1987, no. 1804, p. 2 short information on chemical fertilisers
available to every potential user. “HES” 15.09.1367AP / 05.12.1988, no. 2234, p. 3 short inform-
ation on mechanisation of farming. “HES” 13.07.1362AP / 05.10.1983, no. 637, p. 3 short in-
formation on positive aspects of mechanisation of farming in the DDR. “HES” 12.08.1362AP /
03.11.1983, no. 661, p. 3 short information on new tractors delivered by the USSR and a group
of Soviet agrarian advisers that came to Afghanistan. “HES” 18.08.1363AP / 07.05.1984, no.
820, p. 1. short information on agricultural machines centres equipped by the DRA gov-
ernment. Māshinhā dar zerāʼat [Machines in agriculture], “HES” 30.03.1363AP / 19.06.1984,
no. 856, p. 1. Dar tākestānhā-ye porbār [In vineyards full of fruit], “HES” 04.01.1364AP /
24.03.1985, no. 1084, p. 1–2. “HES” 22.03.1364AP / 12.06.1985, no. 1152, p. 2 on Afghan peas-
ants learning how to drive tractors.Dastāvardhā va niyāzhā-ye dehqānān-e Kondoz [Achieve-
ments and needs of the peasants of Kunduz], “HES” 04.08.1364AP / 26.10.1985, no. 1260, p. 4.
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Figure 5: HES 24.08.1360AP / 15.11.1981, no. 185 p. 2. The photograph is ac-
companied by information that Afghan peasants, frequently referred to in
the press as dehqānān-e zahmatkesh “toiling farmers,” used to till the land
with the sweat of their brows using simple tools only. It was only the Saur
Revolution that made technological improvements in the countryside more
accessible to them.
To transform reality into Socialism, as E. Dobrenkowould say,40 a graphic
designer needed to use local elements familiar to the addressee.41 This is
why the peasant’s outfit is characteristic of rural areas and consists of a long
green shirt, a red vest and awhite turban. Contrary to the peasant completely
“HES” 10.04.1365AP / 01.07.1986, no. 1469, p. 3 on peasants producing more due to the PDPA
support.
40 Dobrenko E., Socrealisticheskiy realizm i realnyy socyalizm (Soveckiye estetika i kritika i pro-
izvodstvo realnosti), “Colloquia” 2007, no. 180, p. 91.
41 Such techniques are not just the domain of socialist realism. Already Amanullah Khan wore
during meetings with peasants a country outfit (L. B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in
Afghanistan, 1919–1929, Ithaca-London 1973, p. 79). The choice of graphic elements/outfit
has a specific psychological effect – it creates (or it should create) a connection between the
content and the recipient of the content.
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dressed in white, found on the postage stamp presented above, the colours
of his shirt and vest refer to the colours of the flag of the DRA. This cannot
be a coincidence since on the other “Day of the Peasant” postage stamps is-
sued in 1984, all the male characters wear long white shirts and white, red or
blue vests. Neither can this be a question of graphic composition or aesthet-
ics alone. The choice of the colours can refer to the ideologically postulated
unity of the peasants and the DRA government:
It should be recalled that in the current situation establishing the
integration of peasant groups, establishing of integration of the
workers and the peasants, and deepening the process of joining
the revolution by the peasants is one of the urgent needs that
lies behind a series of plans and revolutionary measures.42
The fact that the peasant holds up his land certificate to make it clearly
visible is of great significance here. He seems to be explaining to us, or even
shouting, that his success and prosperity represented by wheat or the tractor
results from the land tenure as well as land-use rights, are guaranteed by the
official authorities. This indirectly expressed statement can be even under-
stood more generally as the success and prosperity of all the country and is
only achievable when the peasants become full owners of their tilled fields.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that on the postage stamp below, issued
in 1981, we can see a group of farmers holding a slogan Zamin māl-e kasi-st
ke bālā-ye ān kār mi-konad “The land belongs to those who till it”.
The aforementioned slogan is obviously a simplification of the programme
of the PDPA, but it quite often appears in different memories, inter alia, by A.
Misāq (1937–2016) – a writer, leftist politician, minister of finance (1978–9),
mayor of Kabul (1980s):43
Perhaps in the history of Afghanistan, these are unique decrees.
(…) that the land reform was such that everyone who worked
above the ground would be on his land.44
42 Dar rah-e edame-ye eslahat-e demurkarik-e arzi, “HES” 03.06.1360AP / 25.08.1981, no. 151,
p. 1.
43 L. W. Adamec, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, Metuchen-London 1991, p. 160.
44 A. Arqandāvi, Khāterehā va tahlilhā. Tārikh-e mokhtasar-e Afqānestā nar navad sāl-e akhir,
s.l. 1377AP, p. 155. Cf. L. Dupree, Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan. Part
II: Steps Six Trough Nine – and Beyond?, “AUFS. American Universities Field Staff. Reports”
1978, no. 14, pp. 3–4.
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Figure 6: The postage stamp issued on 21 March 1980 (R. Jack, Afghanistan…,
p. 17) Here one can see peasants receiving their land tenure certificates de-
livered by three representatives of the central government. The ceremony
is changing into a political manifestation expressed by the slogan Eslāhāt-
e arzi-ye demokrātik feodālizm-rā rishekan sākht “Democratic land reform
eradicated feudalism” as well as into a festival of joy as some peasants dance
after apparently receiving their certificates while another play the drums.
The small, regular fields in the background suggest that the reform is fair
and equal. (private collection)
However, does such a statement not undermine the property right, which,
as we can read on the poster, is respected and guaranteed by the DRA gov-
ernment?
4 (Pseudo-)Reality of the Land Reform
The reality depicted on the analysed poster, selected postage stamps as well
as in a few newspaper articles looks very bright. Full of enthusiasm and grate-
ful to the DRA government, the peasants work hard for the greater good.
Considering the nature of socialist realism which is always accompanied by
the acceptance of an artificially constructed and idealised (pseudo-)reality
the poster tries to convince us that others have already accepted its message
and we are the last not to do so.45
A close examination of Decree No. 8 reveals that some of its points had
been adapted from the ineffective land reform started by M.-D. Khan (1973–
78) a few years before:
45W. Tomasik, Okolice socrealizmu. Prawie tuzin szkiców, Bydgoszcz 2009, p. 40–41.
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Ascertaining the limit of property, elimination of unjust relation-
ships between the farmer and the land owner, and agricultural
worker, improvement in conditions of poor farmers with small
holdings, and distribution of land to the deserving and landless
people, absorption of more active population in the agricultural
sector, so far as the capacity of this sector allows, expansion of
agricultural extension and research programmes for greater ef-
fectiveness of the agricultural sector, ensuring the right of land-
ownership to those who really work on the land, putting greater
emphasis on cooperative systems and ultimately raising overall
production levels.46
The PDPA adapted the words of the former finance minister S. Abdullah
(1973–8) about “elimination of unjust relationship between the farmer and
the land owner, and agricultural worker” or “ensuring the right of landowner-
ship to thosewho reallywork on the land”, giving them amore radical tone in
terms of the “elimination of feudal and pre-feudal conditions from the social
and economic structures of the country” as we can read in Decree No. 8 and
in terms of the slogan “the land belongs to those who till it” as we can read on
one of the postage stamps. But, in reference to the ’79 LR one aspect ought
to be emphasised, the DRA government did not intend to suppress private
property and only a small percentage of land was reserved for agricultural
cooperatives and state-owned farms. Notwithstanding, the reform itself was
supposed to change both the social character of the Afghan countryside as
well as to re-shape its ineffective economy based on poor husbandry. Decree
No. 6 officially ended the gerau mortgage system, while Decree no. 8 offi-
cially repealed the complex socio-economic system dominating the Afghan
countryside referred to in DRA propaganda as feudalism.47 Additionally, it
expanded and strengthened the relationship between the peasants and the
rest of society, and finally increased production efficiency:
(2) popularizing, strengthening and deepening the union of the
working class and peasant classes, in order to strengthen as
much as possible the unity of the people of Afghanistan in the
46 Land Reforms in Afghanistan, “Aryana. Afghanistan Republic. Special Issue”, Summer 1975,
p. 24.
47 O. Roy presents a short but incisive critique of the land reform in his Islam and Resistance
in Afghanistan (Cambridge 1986, pp. 86–92).
PJAC New Series 7 (1/2018): 29–54
Kłagisz, The land belongs to those who till it! 47
struggle for the construction of a society without antagonistic
classes and free from any kind of exploitation of man by man;
(3) increase in the volume of agricultural production, in order to
provide the people with quantitatively adequate foodstuffs, as
well as raw materials suitable for agricultural export and for the
indispensable development of the country.48
The fact that the socio-economic structure of the Afghan countryside
preserved the complex feudal system dramatically degenerated its productiv-
ity. As M. S. Noorzoy writes “[i]n Afghanistan no large-scale substitution
of capital has occurred for labor-intensive methods on the farm, and labor
productivity has remained relatively stagnant”.49 Among the various factors
shaping the ineffectiveness of the Afghan peasants enumerated by experts
are: (1) the limited size of arable land (ca. 12%); (2) the uneven geographical
distribution of arable land; (3) the small average size of farm holdings (ca. 3.5
ha); (4) inefficient land tenure; (5) lack of modern irrigation techniques; (6)
the limited use of chemical fertilizer, thereby constraining land yield; (7) the
predominance of an autarkic structure and barter/counter trade; and (8) lim-
ited private investment due to the lack of capital and high costs of borrowing
in the private capital market.50 Noland- and smallholders had no access to
state financial support and were dependant on the gerau mortgage system:
Either because the land does not belong to himself, or because
of his insecurity he shows no special interest in boosting pro-
ductivity although with greater production on the area put un-
der his tillage there will also be a relative rise in his share. But
this share is in no way comparable to the profit that will accrue
to the landowner.51
Smallholders or those who lease land through lack of ownership, en-
tangled in an expanded system of economic dependencies, did not invest in
new technologies or cultivation techniques that would raise the quality, pro-
ductivity and yield of their work. FollowingD. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinsonʼs
48 Decree no. 8.
49M. S. Noorzoy, Alternative Economic Systems for Afghanistan, “International Journal Middle
East Studies” 15, 1983, p. 27.
50 Ibidem, p. 27–28.
51 Land Reforms in Afghanistan, “Aryana. Afghanistan Republic. Special Issue”, Summer 1975,
p. 24.
PJAC New Series 7 (1/2018): 29–54
Kłagisz, The land belongs to those who till it! 48
statement expressed in their bookWhy Nations Fail,we can say that Afghan
peasants had been dominated by extractive economic and political institu-
tions “which concentrate power in the hands of a few, who will then have
incentives to maintain and develop extractive economic institutions for their
benefit and use the resources they obtain to cement their hold on political
power”.52 Such institutions in no way contributed to raising the economic
level of agricultural production. Surprisingly, despite the fact that agricul-
ture was the main source of income and employment in Afghanistan after
the Second World War, an appropriate perspective on the critical role of ag-
riculture in the Afghan economy was lacking and “a long-run commitment
was not maintained to push for a more rapid development of agriculture and
allocate resources to this sector commensurate with the capacity of the sec-
tor to generate output”.53
The ’79 LR, in their haste, was unacceptable to the majority in the coun-
tryside. The would-be Marxist-Leninist reformers projected detailed rules
to change the structure of ownership as well as the distribution of water,
thereby guaranteeing rights to groups thus far limited, but at the cost of the
landlords.54 However, to carry out the land reform that was economically ne-
cessary, well-trained officials should have been delegated to the countryside,
especially since, as F. L. Pryor writes, the Afghan government tried to im-
plement land reform twice before 1979 but always with poor results mostly
because of the complex land tenure structure resulting from extensive rela-
tions between tenants and landlords. The landlords guaranteed the tenants
access to water or basic loans in return for their rents. They also represented
them in contacts with the central government because of the weak central-
isation of Afghan administration. It was a landlord who would take care of a
peasant’s interests in relations with the state and vice versa. L. Tabibi states
that “in order to carry out an agrarian reform efficiently, these features of
socio-political structures in the countryside must not be forgotten”.55 Mean-
52 D. Acemgolu, J. A. Robinson,Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty,
New York 2012, p. 471.
53M. S. Noorzoy, Alternative Economic Systems for Afghanistan, International Journal Middle
East Studies 15, 1983, p. 26.
54 According to the official data that should be treated with caution before 1978 ca. ⅓ of peas-
ants owned no land at all. Among those who owned 39% had no more than 1 ha, 32% no
more than 2 ha, 17% no more than 4 ha, 7% no more than 10 ha and only 5% no more than
100 ha (H.-J. Radde, E. Dummer, Revolutionäres Afghanistan, Berlin 1980, p. 77).
55 L. Tabibi, Die afghanische Landreform von 1979: Ihre Vorgeschichte und Konsequenz, Berlin
1981, p. 64.
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while there were problems just at the initial stage of the ’79 LR because the
DRA government did not have enough people to carry out such a basic task.
Most of the leftists lived in cities and had limited knowledge regarding the
social-economic relations between tenants and landlords. One can say that
they boiled those relations down to mere feudalism – a key word present in
most official speeches and slogans. Ideologically-based purges in the admin-
istration meant that the DRA authorities expelled many experienced officials
who, due to their age, education or connections, could have supported the re-
form.56 Additionally, partisan struggles between the Khalq and the Parcham
PDPA factions reduced the operational capabilities of the government. As F.
L. Pryor writes, “(…) the government decided to implement the reforms with
relatively fewer cadre (…). These cadre, moreover, spent only a brief time in
each village and, therefore, did not attempt to organize the village in perman-
ent self-governing structures to aid in the implementation of the reform or
to sustain the reform after they left”.57 Even if at the beginning of the ’79 LR
about 80% of the peasants who possessed less than 20 jerib (ca. 2000 m2) ac-
cepted the changes, soon they had many reasons whereby they approached
reform with some reserve.58 In areas where there was little cultivated land,
they were moved to other places, often inhabited by other ethnic groups.
F. Ahmed blamed the DRA government’s lack of understanding of the ba-
sic problems of the Afghan countryside.59 However, one might ask whether
the breakdown of traditional structures of political dependencewas notmore
important for the PDPA. Instead of traditional complex dependency, a new
social model was forced as jāmeʾ-ye novin (new society) based on the prin-
ciples of equality and brotherhood.These noble, in principle, goals also had a
deeper meaning – the PDPA wanted to crush social relations only to replace
current political leaders, landowners, clergymen, the community or tribal
leaders. Such a political manoeuvre would help it to replace past extract-
ive economic institutions with new ones organised by and ancillary to the
PDPA. How can one be sure about this? First of all, extractive economic in-
stitutions do not respect property rights while ownership and a natural need
for others and public institutions to recognize one’s own rights is one of the
56 F. L. Pryor, The Red and the Green. The Rise and Fall of Collectivized Agriculture in Marxist
Regimes, Princeton 1992, p. 93.
57 Ibidem, p. 94.
58 O. Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge 1986, pp. 86.
59 F Ahmed, J. Paul, The Khalq Failed to Comprehend the Contradictions of the Rural Sector. In-
terview with Feroz Ahmend, “MERIP Reports” 1980, no. 89, pp. 13–20.
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key factors ensuring the success of any reform. In various memories about
the first months of communist rule, property rights violation is a constantly
theme.That iswhy on the analysed poster twowords qānun “law” and tazmin
“guarantee” appear in the slogan. And this is also why this poster represents
an artificially constructed and idealised socialist-realist (pseudo-)reality.
Simplifications, neglect and ignorance of a number of social-economic
characteristics and contradictions of the countryside at the beginning of the
’79 LR meant that agricultural production decreased. Socialist propaganda
very often missed the truth, emphasising constant economic growth and
turning a blind eye to economic failures. No wonder Afghanistan Today an-
nounced proudly:
To boost agricultural products, peasants in Afghanistan make
enormous use of modern agricultural machinery60
and completed its utterance with a colourful picture of red combine har-
vesters standing in line.61
5 Conclusions
As in both previous texts, one question arises: does the observer understand
the message conveyed by the (non)iconic elements of the poster? Or maybe
such a composition transcends readability due to its socialist-realistic nature.
To stay in power, the authorities must use phraseology that is clear for the
audience so the form of persuasion should be constructed collectively by ma-
nipulative practitioners. Those who are aware of Marxist-Leninist ideology
can more or less read the poster presented above. Those who are not, will
not read it properly just as in the case of L. Wittgenstein’s language-games
indicating that each action can be understood only because the participants
in the game have prior knowledge of its rules. To learn the rules one needs
to be constantly surrounded by the object in the same way that persuasion
is more effective than compulsion. In the case of Afghanistan, access to such
ideological posters, press or poetry was limited by the civil war to major cit-
ies. Consequently, the DRA government was not able to broaden its social
basis and to build its social base necessary for political activities. Various
60 Solaiman, New Socio-Economic Plan, Afghanistan Today no. 2 (March-April), 1990, p. 21.
61 Ibidem.
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actions taken by the DRA government after ideological-political changes in
1980 proved to be insufficient. Not only did land reform fail in general but
the results turned out to be the opposite of its intended goals.
All the observations presented above are intended to simulate further,
more complex research on the subject and will, hopefully, allow two unre-
solved questions to be answered. To the two question presented in Part 2, I
would add one more:
(3) Did the DRA government’s failure result only from non-propaganda
factors as, inter alia, the attitude of the communist authorities to particular
social groups, or should issues such as the selection of techniques or means
of communication also be taken into account?
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